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This engaging and accessible book offers a spirited defence of armchair philosophy, against a 
perceived threat from experimental philosophy. About twenty years ago, methodological 
rationalists (like George Bealer and Ernest Sosa) developed a picture of philosophical work 
that lets us understand how philosophical questions can be addressed from the armchair: 
Philosophers consider descriptions of possible cases in thought experiments which engage their 
conceptual competencies and elicit intuitions about the cases considered. Such intuitions 
provide evidence for or against many philosophical claims, e.g., about the concepts, nature, or 
essence of things like moral permissibility or knowledge. Philosophical theorising then 
proceeds by working back and forth between intuitions about specific cases and background 
beliefs and general principles, until a reflective equilibrium and a coherent set of beliefs have 
been achieved. This still popular picture provides philosophy with a distinctive methodology 
that can be applied from the proverbial armchair but goes beyond offering philosophers the 
license to just follow their argumentative noses. 
Experimental philosophy (x-phi) has developed largely in response to this picture and 
suggests the picture cannot provide a defence of armchair philosophy: It is an empirical 
question what intuitions about particular cases competent concept-users have. To find out to 
what extent her intuitions are representative, the philosopher needs to conduct surveys or 
experiments. ‘Negative’ x-phi went further and recruited empirical methods to also address the 
question of where intuitions can (not) serve as evidence: This research program uses surveys 
and experiments to study the sensitivity of intuitions to truth-irrelevant parameters (like the 
order in which cases are presented), and infers lack of evidentiary value where it observes such 
sensitivity. In response, armchair philosophers who accept the popular picture of philosophy 
sought to defend their use of the ‘method of cases’ by dismissing as irrelevant the intuitions of 
non-experts (like the undergraduate participants in many x-phi studies) or by interpreting 
variability in intuitions as indicative of variability in concepts. 
Deutsch convincingly rejects these responses as ‘weak, verging on desperate’ (xx), and 
develops a more fundamental line of defence, previously deployed by Herman Cappelen (2012) 
(who drew on an earlier paper by Deutsch): Deutsch argues ‘there is no way to defend 
“armchair philosophy” from x-phi’s challenge if one accepts the view that intuitions are 
[treated as] evidence [in philosophy]’ (132). Accordingly, the book attacks this widely held 
view as a ‘myth’: Deutsch accepts that thought experiments play a crucial role in analytic 
philosophy, but argues that philosophical thought experiments appeal to reason and argument 
at every stage, and to intuitions at none. He seeks to debunk the ‘myth of the intuitive’ by 
‘demonstrating that analytic philosophers give arguments for their judgments about thought 
experiments and cases’ (xvi), and that these arguments provide them with what justification 
they need for these case-judgments. Intuitions are surplus to justificatory requirements. 
Like Cappelen, Deutsch treats the question, whether philosophers adduce intuitions as 
evidence, as empirical, and seeks to support a negative answer by examining first-order 
philosophical texts (78,101-2). His main argument proceeds from two chapter-length case-
studies on influential thought experiments, by Gettier and Kripke, which were the target of 
seminal contributions to negative x-phi. The argument is extended through brief discussion of 
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subsequent exercises in ‘Gettierology’ and six prominent thought experiments involving 
esoteric cases. 
Deutsch deliberately remains agnostic about the nature of intuitions and their 
psychological features. He merely lists uncontroversial examples of philosophically relevant 
‘intuitions’ and points out salient commonalities: They are all judgments about whether, in 
some hypothetical case, something has some philosophically relevant property (25). This ‘no-
theory theory’ of intuitions is all he thinks is required to address the key question, What is the 
argumentative role of intuitions in philosophy? (32).  
The main argument is this (36-8): Like ‘judgment’ and ‘belief’, the term ‘intuition’ can 
stand for both (a) a mental act or state and (b) a content. Much metaphilosophical debate, and 
all negative x-phi, assumes that intuitions in the first sense are adduced as evidence: The fact 
that certain thinkers intuit certain contents (or that these contents are intuitive for them) is 
supposedly adduced as evidence for the truth of these contents – which is illegitimate in case 
truth-irrelevant factors influence whether thinkers intuit them. But, in fact, philosophers adduce 
only intuitions in the second sense as evidence: To support or refute more general claims 
(Knowledge is justified true belief), they invoke contents about specific cases (Smith does not 
know that…). Typically, the contents invoked strike many thinkers as intuitive; i.e., many 
thinkers intuit them. But the contents’ acceptance as true is not justified by reference to their 
intuitive nature, but by further argument. 
Deutsch’s case studies are meant to support this crucial claim. His prime exhibits are 
thought experiments designed by Gettier and Kripke to refute philosophical theories (like the 
justified-true-belief account of knowledge), by providing counterexamples. For the 
philosophical argument to work, these counterexamples have to be genuine, but need not be 
intuitive for anyone (even if, in empirical fact, they are) (40). Justification for accepting them 
as genuine is provided by argument for the key judgment about the given case. Appeals to 
intuitiveness are not required – and not made by the authors examined. 
For example, Deutsch points out (43,81,85) that Gettier supports the crucial judgment (J) 
about his first case by argument (A) about the proposition (e) ‘The man who will get the job 
has ten coins in his pocket’: 
‘In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes (e) 
is true, and (iii) Smith is justified… But it is equally clear that [J] Smith does not know 
that (e) is true; for [A] (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while 
Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in the 
truth of (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’ pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the 
man who will get the job.’ 
For each thought experiment he considers, Deutsch thus tries to identify arguments the 
thought experimentalist adduces to justify the key judgment that is commonly regarded as an 
intuition. In some cases (e.g., Gettier and Lehrer’s Truetemp), Deutsch succeeds more clearly 
than in others (Kripke’s Gödel case [106-111] and Jackson’s colour scientist [115]) to identify 
potentially relevant arguments. He takes these prima facie arguments to support the 
metaphilosophical hypothesis that thought experimentalists support their key case judgments 
by argument, and do not rely on the intuitiveness of these judgments. 
How do thought experimentalists then justify acceptance of the relevant arguments’ 
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premises? By reference to their intuitiveness or through further argument? That is: Does 
reliance on intuitiveness merely move to a further step of the reasoning? In response to this 
‘relocation problem’ (61), Deutsch discusses precisely one example from the first-order 
literature to support the answer that, again, philosophers adduce arguments, instead of relying 
on intuitiveness (123). The book does not examine the relocation problem for the other cases 
it discusses, leaving its empirical argument noticeably incomplete. 
However, there may be a more serious problem. According to negative x-phi’s version 
of the picture of philosophy Deutsch attacks, the book’s main argument puts things back-to-
front. According to this view, ‘intuition supports the thought-experimental judgments, and then 
those judgments are assumed in abductive arguments for explanatory principles’ (97). The 
mere presence of prima facie arguments for specific case-judgments therefore does not 
establish that philosophers do not accept these judgments on the strength of their intuitiveness: 
These arguments should not be conceived as deductive or inductive arguments for specific 
case-judgments, but as abductive arguments for general principles that would explain those 
judgments – whose truth is taken for granted due to their intuitiveness. 
Deutsch grants this is a ‘possible view’ but argues only briefly against it (97-99): First, 
he claims, philosophical thought experiments never involve explicit appeal to the intuitiveness 
of a case judgment, followed by an explicit search for the best explanation. The best 
explanation for this supposed fact then is that philosophers do not seek such abductive 
arguments (97). Second, the abductive picture seems plausible from the perspective of the 
reader of a thought experiment, but ‘plainly absurd’ from the perspective of its author: Gettier, 
say, did not intuit that Smith does not know, but inferred this from the ‘recipe’ with which he 
‘cooked up’ his counterexamples to the justified-true-belief theory (98). 
The first of these claims is unsupported by any discussion of apparent counterexamples, 
such as Thomson’s (1985) discussion of trolley cases. This is regrettable since Cappelen (2012, 
158-163) merely argued that this paradigm case of intuition-driven philosophising does not 
rely on a specific kind of intuitions, ‘rational intuitions’, but did not argue against the abductive 
interpretation. Deutsch’s second response is prima facie plausible. For example, a ‘recipe’ for 
Gettier cases calls for a belief that is justified but, even so, true as a matter of luck (5); and 
Gettier indeed infers the absence of knowledge in his second case from the feature that the 
protagonist is right ‘by the sheerest coincidence’ (82). But does that mean that Gettier did not 
intuit the lack of knowledge? Or that the intuitiveness of the inferred conclusion is irrelevant 
for its acceptance? 
To address these questions, we need to advance from Deutsch’s ‘no-theory theory’ of 
intuitions to the psychological notion most experimental philosophers implicitly use: Intuitions 
are judgments generated by automatic inferences, i.e., by effortless and typically unconscious 
cognitive processes which duplicate inferences with heuristic or other rules (Kahneman and 
Frederick 2005). When thinkers leap to a conclusion, without being able to explain how or 
why, prior to sustained reflection, they are relying on automatic inferences, and their 
conclusions are intuitions. Some philosophical case-intuitions have been explained by 
reference to automatic processes which constantly go on in language comprehension and 
production, and support semantic and stereotypical inferences (Fischer and Engelhardt 2016). 
Language production includes the subvocalized speech that is the medium of much 
philosophical thought. It is therefore not ‘plainly absurd’ but perfectly possible that original 
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thought experimentalists arrive at their judgments in this way, i.e., that they intuit them, when 
considering what is true of a case conforming to a ‘recipe’ they are trying out. (E.g.: 
‘Accidentally true guesses don’t qualify as knowledge. What if a justified belief is accidentally 
true? Here’s a possible case…’) 
Precisely in the cases where Deutsch most clearly succeeds in identifying arguments 
adduced for thought-experimental judgments, the arguments (like A above) consist in direct 
inferences from mere restatements of case features, to the key conclusion, without further 
explanation or argument (174, cp.177). Whether a thinker is inclined to accept a conclusion 
without further explanation or argument depends upon her level of subjective confidence 
(Thompson et al. 2011), which also predicts how likely the judgment is to be accepted by others 
(Koriat 2008). In the absence of specific topic knowledge, this subjective confidence does not 
depend upon the content of the judgment, but on properties of the cognitive process generating 
it, in particular on the ‘fluency’ or subjective ease with which it comes to mind (Alter and 
Oppenheimer 2009). Ultimately, the high fluency of automatic processes is what leads to the 
confident and wide acceptance of the conclusions that thinkers infer without quite knowing 
how or why – as apparently in Deutsch’s clearest examples. This means that even when thinkers 
do not explicitly appeal to its ‘plausibility’ or ‘obviousness’, the intuitive character of such a 
conclusion may be what makes them accept it without further ado. To what extent the cases 
Deutsch discusses involve such implicit reliance on intuitiveness remains to be examined. 
As to the larger picture: Where thinkers engage in speculative thought, they will 
frequently base their arguments on premises that simply strike them as plausible and that are 
likely to be accepted by others. The psychological research just indicated suggests that such a 
basis is exactly what intuitions provide. 
While The Myth of the Intuitive may not succeed in establishing its ambitious conclusion, 
this thought-provoking book effectively challenges simplistic conceptions of how philosophers 
rely on intuitions. This significantly advances a key debate about the nature of our subject. 
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